We propose the use of the cubic transformation for public-key applications and digital signatures. Transformations modulo a prime p or a composite n = pq, where p and q are primes, are used in such a fashion that each transformed value has only 3 roots that makes it a more efficient transformation than the squaring transformation of Rabin, which has 4 roots. Such a transformation, together with additional tag information, makes it possible to uniquely invert each transformed value. The method may be used for other exponents as well.
Introduction
Certain many-to-one mappings, when used together with additional side information, may be uniquely inverted and used for public-key cryptography and digital signatures. Given message m in Z n , we propose the use of the encryption function c = m 3 mod n under suitable restrictions on m and n. We will be primarily interested in the case where 3 divides the Euler totient function φ(n), but 9 does not.
For secure communication, Alice transmits to Bob c together with side information which may be sent in an encrypted form or published.
This transformation is more efficient than the mapping c = m 2 mod n proposed by Michael Rabin [1] that has the virtue of being provably at most as intractable as the factorization of n. In his article, Rabin did consider generalization beyond the squaring function, but he dismissed the use of higher powers for their relative inefficiency. Specifically, he spoke of the 9 cube roots in the cubic mapping, having implicitly taken n to be divisible by 9, which made it less efficient than the squaring transformation with its four roots.
The n that we choose ensures only three cube roots for each value making it more efficient than the squaring transformation. We also consider extensions of our side information scheme to the case when n is divisible by 9. Given its easy implementation, the proposed cubic transformation lends itself to public key applications. Specifically,
• It makes additional exponents available in exponentiation transformations [2, 3] and for key-distribution systems that use powers of primitive roots.
• It makes it possible to use a small exponent to send information and implement digital signatures.
• It allows the generation of probability events based on whether the parity of the bit chosen by the recipient is the same as the one picked at the sending point.
The cube roots of 1 are 1, α and α 2 because if α is a root, so is its square. This implies that if one of the cube roots of c is m, the others must be mα and mα 2 . The three cube roots of 1 may be obtained by solving the equation:
Apart from the obvious solution of 1, the other two solutions are obtained by solving α 2 +α+1 = 0, which is possible if the square root of √ p − 3 exists. This may be determined by the use of Euler's criterion that b is square modulo p if and only if
Since p = 3 mod 4, the square root a 1/2 = a p+1 4 , and we can write,
Since the two roots can also be written as α and α 2 , the value of α may be equivalently expressed as:
If the square root of (p − 3) does not exist, one must use a probabilistic method to determine α. Note that 1 + α + α 2 = 0 mod p. This follows from the fact that (1 + α + α 2 ) 3 = 1. This means that the value of α 2 may be obtained by subtraction. The complexity of this computation is no more than that of exponentiation. = 28 8 which is equal to 20. Therefore, α = −21/2, 19/2, which may be reduced to 5 and 25. The cube roots of 1 are, therefore, 1, 5, 25. We may pick one of these, say 5, as α.
Let Alice choose m = 7. She computes m, mα, mα 2 , which are 4, 20, 7. Rearranging them in order, she gets 4, 7, 20 that correspond to the ranks 1, 2, 3, and thus the side information related to her choice of m is 2.
Alice sends c = 7 3 mod 31 = 2, together with the rank information of 2 (that is either published or sent in an encrypted form separately) to Bob. Using equation (1), Bob finds that one of its cube roots is 2 7 mod 31 = 4. The other cube roots will be 4 × 5 = 20 mod 31, and 20 × 5 = 7 mod 31. The side information then helps him pick m = 7 as the message sent by Alice. 3 Cubic transformation modulo a composite number
We now consider the cubic transformation modulo n = pq, where φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is divisible by 3 but not 9. Then the inverse is given by:
The method of inverse transformation is identical to that in the previous section, excepting that under certain circumstances the computation of α will require solving equation (2) modulo the two prime factors of n and then combining them to get the answer modulo n. Both Alice and Bob know the factors of n, but the eavesdropper does not.
Example 2. Consider c = m 3 mod 77; p = 7, q = 11. To find the value of α by the method of equation (3), we must obtain √ p − 3 = √ 74. But 74 is not square modulo 77, therefore, we find the solution directly by the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), by solving:
separately for the two moduli 7 and 11. We can try to obtain these solutions using the method of equation (3). Note that only one new solution is required to fix α and, therefore, it is not essential that solutions to both the primes are found. For p=7, p − 3 = 4 is square modulo 7, and, therefore, the solutions are easily obtained:
But 8 is not square modulo 11, therefore, equation (3) cannot be used for it. We, therefore, merely use the obvious solution:
Combining, using the CRT,
where ||x|| y = x mod y. Since 7 −1 mod 11 = 8, and 11 −1 mod 7 = 2, we have: Consider the message Alice wishes to send is m = 12. As in the previous case, she finds its companions by multiplying it successively by α = 23, thus obtaining 34, and 45. The rank order of her message is 1.
She now performs the cubic transformation on her message 12, sending Bob c = 34 together with the side information of 1. Bob knows that the message was one of the three 12, 34, and 45. The side information tells him that the specific message out of this set is 12.
Since there are three solutions, the side information will require 2 bits.
φ(n) divisible by 9
The method proposed will actually work even for φ(n) that is divisible by 9. Although each number will now have 9 cube roots, they may be bunched together in separate groups in a variety of ways. The 9 cube roots of 1 may be obtained by solving
which may be simplified to:
Let the cube roots of 1 be put in numerical order and labeled 1 through 9. Alice would take the message she wishes to send to Bob and find all the multiples of it with the cube roots of 1, and find its relative position in the set. Then she will send the original message with this position number as side information.
Bob will obtain the cube root of c and then list all its companion solutions. Given the position number, he will then be able to determine its value.
Example 3. Consider c = m 3 mod 91, where φ(n) = 72. Since 88 is square modulo 91, one can use equation (3) to determine the cube roots of 1 modulo 91, and a simple calculation gives us the values 9 and 81. Since 9 and 81 are not cubes themselves, we cannot use equation (8) to find the remaining cube roots. Additional cube roots of 1 are obtained by solving the equation α 3 − 1 = 0 for the two moduli 7 and 13 (4 and 10 are square modulo 7 and 13, respectively) and using CRT to combine the results. We end up with the following 9 cube roots of 1: 1, 9, 16, 22, 29, 53, 74, 79, 81. Assume Alice wishes to send the message 24 (which is relatively prime to 91, and therefore it has 9 cube roots) to Bob. She finds the multiples of 24 with the cube roots of 1, and obtains the set: 20, 24, 33, 34, 47, 59, 73, 76, and 89. The sequence number of 24 is 2, and this number is sent as side information, together with 24 3 = 83. Bob first finds the cube root of 83 by the use of CRT or some probabilistic algorithm. Suppose, this number is 33. Now he computes the multiples of 33 with all the cube roots of 1, obtaining: 33, 24, 73, 89, 47, 20, 76, 59, 34. Since the side information has revealed that the message has the second rank in this set, he now knows that it is 24.
Probability events
The 9 cube roots of 1 may be written as numbers and their squares:
These may be bunched together in 3 groups. Alternatively, if it is agreed by Alice and Bob that each group of three have 1 in it, these numbers may be put in four groups in the following manner:
Thus, in our example, the four sets will be: 1, 9, 81; 1, 16, 74; 1, 22, 29; 1, 53, 79
Let the protocol require that Bob pick one of these four sets. Bob is also told the rank order within each subgroup. His chances of obtaining the correct message are . It is clear that the groupings could be done differently as well. But whichever way the groupings are done, they are incorporated in the protocol of the communicating parties.
Generalizations
Generalizations of this method to higher exponents may be readily made.
The method of tags may also be applied to the squaring transformation. Once a square roots α of 1 (other than 1 or n − 1) is known, the full set of solutions follows:
One needs 2 bits of side information to uniquely identify the message m that gave rise to the received c.
For kth-roots of 1 related to the solution to c = m k mod n, k odd, the number of groups to generate probability events in the manner of equation (10) will be k + 1, that is
, corresponding to the probability of .
Random number generation
The cubic transformation may also be used to generate random numbers s i in a manner analogous to the squaring transformation [4] . Let s 0 be the seed and let n = pq for primes p, q, where φ(n) is divisible by 9, and s 0 is relatively prime to n, then,
The condition of divisibility of φ(n) by 9 is to increase the computational burden of inverting the transformation. The tree of possibilities has 9 branches at each step. For a cryptographically strong random number generator to radix-r that generates the sequence c i , one may reduce the numbers s i to the modulus r, where r < n: c i = s i mod r
For binary random numbers generated by this equation, r will be 2.
